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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC
SCHOOL FINANCING LAWS: JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE INTERACTION
I. Introduction
Several recent cases have presented constitutional challenges to
state laws regulating public school funding.' Opponents of these
laws charge that state funding schemes which rely primarily upon
revenue derived from local property taxes create marked disparities
in the amount of money spent per pupil among school districts
within the same state.! It is argued that these disparities in per pupil
expenditures create unequal educational opportunities3 in violation
1. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976);
Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793,
537 P.2d 635 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Seattle School Dist. v. State, 90 Wash.
2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
2. The amount of revenue spent on behalf of school students is related to the amount of
revenue generated by local property taxes within the school district. Such tax revenue is
attributable to: 1) variations in the tax rate imposed by districts; and 2) the value of taxable
property within a district. An increase in the property tax rate, or in the value of taxable
property, will increase the amount of revenue generated for students. See generally San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 73-74 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3. The quality of a child's education has been held by several state courts to be a function
of the revenue spent per pupil by a school district. See e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728,
557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976); Horton v. Meskill, 173 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
The United States Supreme Court, however, has characterized this proposition as "unsettled
and disputed" and has indicated that it is "a matter of considerable dispute among educators
and commentators." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 n.56 (1973).
Proponents of the proposition that quality of education is related to expenditure levels argue
that property-rich districts can afford a greater number of more qualified teachers than their
property-poor counterparts. Opponents argue, however, that higher teacher-student ratios do
not necessarily improve the quality of the student's education. Further, they dispute the
proposition that a highly paid teacher is better equipped to teach than one paid compara-
tively less money.
The Supreme Court has accepted the proposition that "there is a correlation ... between
revenue and quality of education received up to the point of providing the recognized essen-
tials in facilities and academic opportunities .... " Id. at 47 n.101. The Court has ques-
tioned, however, whether variations in pupil-teacher ratios and salary levels have an effect
on the quality of education. Id. at 47. According to the Court "there appears to be few
empirical data that support the advantage of any particular pupil-teacher ratio or that
document the existence of a dependable correlation between the level of public school
teacher's salaries and the quality of their classroom instructions." Id. The Court has stated
that the "ultimate wisdom" in the quality-cost controversy was not likely to be "divined for
all time." Accordingly, the Court has refused to impose on the States "inflexible constitu-
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of both state and federal equal protection clauses' and state educa-
tion guarantees.'
The legal basis upon which courts have invalidated state public
school finance laws varies among states. Since San Antonio School
District v. Rodriguez,' however, it has been difficult to fashion an
argument against public school finance laws based upon alleged
violations of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. In Rodriguez, a group of parents whose children attended
public school in Texas brought a class action on behalf of all chil-
dren residing in school districts with low property tax bases.' The
parents argued that their children were denied equal protection
under the Federal Constitution because the disparate revenues gen-
erated among school districts within Texas resulted in unequal edu-
cational opportunities among students throughout the state.' The
tional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimen-
tation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping
abreast of ever-changing conditions." Id. at 43. See also C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY (1972); C.
SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1970); U.S. OFFICE OP EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
5. Educational guarantees, contained in maiy state constitutions, are commitments
made by states regarding the quality of education to be offered. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art.
VIII, § 4, 1. The Education guarantee of one state consitution reads: "The Legislative
Assembly shall provide by law for the establishment of a uniform, and general system of
Common schools." OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. Compare N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 with N.J.
CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1. See also notes 49 & 103 infra and accompanying text.
6. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
7. Id. at 5. Defendants included the Texas State Board of Education, the Commissioner
of Education, the Texas State Attorney General, and the Board of Trustees of the school
boards of the plaintiffs' districts.
8. Id. at 47. The Texas legislature adopted a system of financing referred to as the
"foundation program." California, New Jersey and New York have also adopted the founda-
tion program as a system for financing public school education. In Texas, the state contrib-
uted 80% of the total school revenue while local school districts contributed nearly 20%. Each
school district is required to make a contribution in accordance with its tax-paying ability.
A district's taxpaying ability is determined by a complex formula which takes into account
"the relative value of each county's contribution to the State's total income from manufactur-
ing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative share of all
payrolls paid within the State and, to a lesser extent considers each county's share of all
property in the State." Id. at 10. Each district's contribution is computed based upon the
above formula, and the value of property situated in such district. The revenue generated
from local property tax is contributed to a collective fund. The money from this fund, along
with state contributions, is then distributed by the state to each school district to provide
for a minimum per pupil expenditure among all school districts. Although a minimum per
pupil expenditure exists in Texas, each school district has the right to tax beyond the rate
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United States Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld
the Texas public school finance law.' The Court held that dispari-
ties in the amount of money spent per pupil among school districts
within a state do not create "suspect classifications"'' 0 based on
wealth and that public school education is not a fundamental right
guaranteed either explicitly or implicitly by the United States Con-
stitution." The statute, therefore, did not require strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2
The Court's inquiry was limited to whether the operation of the
Texas statute was rationally related to its purpose. The Court con-
cluded that financing the Texas public schools through local prop-
erty revenue serves the purpose of allowing local districts to deter-
mine the kind of educational experience their students will receive.
The Court held that the operation of the Texas statute was ration-
ally related to this purpose. 3
Since the Rodriguez decision, most state courts sustaining consti-
tutional challenges to public school finance laws have based their
decisions on equal protection and educational guarantees embodied
prescribed by the state. The proceeds from this additional revenue remain within the school
district which generates the tax. "Property-rich" school districts thereby have an opportunity
to generate more money for education than their property-poor counterparts.
9. Id. at 55.
10. Id. at 28.
11. Id. at 35.
12. Id. at 35. Justice Marshall challenged the Court's position that the equal protection
clause permits only a strict scrutiny or rational basis analysis. Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
He suggests that interests not specifically mentioned in the constitution should be consid-
ered fundamental where expressly guaranteed rights depend upon such interests for their
survival. "[AIs the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitu-
tional interests draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and
the degree of judicial scrutiny applied where the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis
must be adjusted accordingly." Id. at 102-03. Justice Marshall maintains that the degree of
judicial scrutiny to be applied by the Court depends as well on the "invidiousness of the
particular classification" involved. Id. at 110. Since education bears on a citizen's ability to
speak freely and to vote, Justice Marshall would demand that the Texas law be strictly
scrutinized by the Court. Id. at 112-14.
13. 411 U.S. at 55. Justice Marshall rejects the application of-the rational basis test in
the factual situation presented in Rodriguez. He questions whether the Texas schools genu-
inely enjoy local control as "statewide laws regulate . . . the most minute details of local
public education." Id. at 126. Further, he argues that "the quality of the educational oppor-
tunity offered by any particular district is largely determined by the amount of taxable
property located in the district a factor over which local voters can exercise no control." Id.
at 128.
676 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
Cahill, " will illustrate the impact courts can have on the legislative
process.
A. Serrano v. Priest
In Serrano v. Priest, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
the California public school finance statute' which depended pri-
marily upon local taxes to fund public education.' The statute
guaranteed a minimum expenditure per pupil within the state.22 To
help effectuate this guarantee, the state provided all districts with
a flat grant for each student. 3 In addition, the state provided certain
property-poor districts with "equalizing aid" to enable them to
reach an established minimum level of expenditure per pupil.24 The
court held that, notwithstanding the minimum expenditure pro-
19. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
20. The public school financing statute operated in a manner similar to the Texas model.
See note 8 supra. The state guaranteed a minimum level of expenditure per pupil, and local
districts were permitted to supplement state contributions. See note 22 infra. Property-rich
districts therefore had the capacity to generate more money for education. 18 Cal. 3d at 746,
557 P.2d at 938, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
21. 18 Cal. 3d at 737, 557 P.2d at 932, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 348. Plaintiffs argued that students
receive unequal protection under the law because the amount of revenue expended per-
student for education depends upon the fortuitous presence of property wealth within a school
district. See note 2 supra. The Serrano court held that disparities in per pupil expenditures
affect the quality of educational opportunities offered. 18 Cal. 3d at 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135
Cal. Rptr. at 355. See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
22. 18 Cal. 3d at 743, 557 P.2d at 935, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351. The minimum expenditure
guaranteed for elementary school students was $765 and for high school students the amount
was $950. Id. at 742, 557 P.2d at 935, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
23. The flat grant amounted to an annual contribution per pupil of $125. Id. at 739, 557
P.2d at 933, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
24. Id. The amount of "equalizing aid" a property poor district received depended upon
how much revenue it raised by local property taxation. "Equalizing aid" amounted to the
difference between the revenue raised locally and the guaranteed minimum amount that the
state required all districts to spend per pupil. Such aid does not equalize the amount of
revenue spent per pupil among all districts; rather, it only provides districts with the mini-
mum per pupil expenditure established by the public school finance act. The amount of
equalizing aid which a district received was determined by a complex formula. The state
would determine
how much local property tax revenue would be generated if [a] district were to levy
a hypothetical tax at a rate of $1 on each $100 of assessed valuation in elementary
school districts and $.80 per $100 in high school districts. . . . To that figure, [the
state] adds the $125 per-pupil basic aid grant. If the sum of those two amounts is less
than the foundation program minimum for that district, the state contributes the
difference.
Id. at 739, 557 P.2d at 933, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
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in state constitutions, rather than on the equal protection clause of
the Federal Constitution." One conspicuous exception is the case of
Board of Education v. Nyquist"5 (hereinafter referred to as
"Levittown"). In this case, a Nassau County Supreme Court judge
held that New York's public school finance law was unconstitu-
tional because it violated both federal and state equal protection
guarantees. This Note, focusing primarily on the Levittown deci-
sion, will demonstrate that the constitutional basis upon which
courts invalidate public school finance laws affects the choices
available to state legislatures when considering various school fi-
nance plans recommended by experts. This Note will conclude that
in the complex field of public school financing, the courts should
expand, rather than restrict, the legislature's freedom to choose
among competing school finance schemes.
II. The State Court Decisions
When called upon to review the constitutionality of a statute, the
judiciary must determine whether federal or state constitutional
guarantees, explicitly or implicitly expressed, have been violated,
Notwithstanding this responsibility, courts may not judge the mer-
its of a particular statute in review." A decision invalidating a stat-
ute on a constitutional basis will, however, affect present or future
legislation by creating constitutional demands. Consideration of
two state court decisions, Serrano v. Priest8 and Robinson v.
14. See, e.g., cases cited in note 1 supra.
15. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 606 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978), appeal docketed,
(App. Div. 2d Dep't Nov. 9, 1979).
16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
17. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.'37 (1971); Bruinooge v. U.S., 550 F.2d 624 (Ct. Cl. 1977);
Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1977).
18. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976). Serrano v. Priest has an
extensive history in the California courts. In 1971, the California school finance system was
the target of a constitutional challenge, but the trial court hearing the case dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court remanded the case for trial, holding that the public school finance statute
denied certain students a fundamental right to education and discriminated against a suspect
classification based on wealth. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). This
case is known as Serrano I. Following the Rodriguez decision in 1973, the California courts
were compelled to reassess the holding in Serrano I that a finance statute was unconstitu-
tional because it violated a student's fundamental right to education under the fourteenth
amendment. The California case decided after Rodriguez is known as Serrano II and is
discussed in this Note.
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vided by the foundation program, there existed marked disparities
in the dollar amount spent per pupil among the districts." The court
accepted the proposition that a positive correlation exists between
"expenditures per pupil" and the "quality and extent of availability
of educational opportunities."2 1 Although it was stated that "an
equal expenditure level per pupil in every district is not education-
ally sound or desirable because of differing educational need,"27 the
court found that the financing system violated the state equal pro-
tection clause by creating "substantial disparities in the quality and
extent of availability of educational opportunities."28
The Serrano court, in deference to the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Rodriguez, maintained that the California stat-
ute could not be held unconstitutional based on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 The court argued, however,
that the equal protection clause of the California State Constitution
demanded greater judicial scrutiny than the equal protection clause
25. Id. at 746, 557 P.2d at 938, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
26. Id. at 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355. There is a dispute among state courts
on this issue. See, e.g., Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973). In Milliken,
the Michigan Supreme Court vacated an earlier judgment in which it declared the Michigan
public school financing law unconstitutional under the state equal protection clause. The
court argued that the evidence relied upon in the earlier decision was based on the premise
that unequal expenditures per pupil resulted in unequal educational opportunities. Upon
reviewing its earlier decision, the court apparently retreated from this notion, stating,
[tihe relationship of expenditures to educational opportunity is being sharply ques-
tioned and is the topic of much current debate among educators. We would be ill-
advised, at this time, to intrude our personal suppositions into this debate in what
could only be, in view of our limited judicial function, a heavy-handed manner.
Id. at 405, 212 N.W.2d at 719. The Idaho Supreme Court, in Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho
793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975) also refused to address the validity of the premise that unequal
expenditures per pupil result in unequal educational opportunities. The court stated:
[Blecause of this ongoing argument as to the relationship of funds expended per-pupil
. . . to the quality of educational opportunity, we refuse to venture into the realm of
social policy under the guise of equal protection of the laws or fundamental right to
education. The courts are ill-suited to a task which is the province of the legislature.
Id. at 800, 537 P.2d at 642. The court held that the Idaho constitution requires only that the
state establish a "general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools." Id.
at 806, 537 P.2d at 648. It concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate that the state
had failed to comply with the state constitutional mandate. See also note 3 supra.
27. 18 Cal. 3d 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 762, 557 P.2d at 949, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 365. In Levittown, however, the Nassau
County judge makes a convincing argument for application of the fourteenth amendment as
a basis for invalidating a state finance law. 94 Misc. 2d at 530, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING
of the Federal Constitution." The court held, on that basis, that
education in California is recognized as a fundamental right3 and
that the constitutionality of the public school finance statute was
therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Only a compelling state
interest would justify the existence of unequal educational oppor-
tunities caused by the operation of the public school finance stat-
ute.3" The court implicitly considered the proposition that local fis-
cal control over education may constitute a compelling state inter-
est. It rejected the state's contention, however, that such control
was achieved under the California statute, noting that only the
property rich districts are "truly able to decide how much [they]
really care about education."33 The court concluded, therefore, that
the California public school finance law violated state equal protec-
tion guarantees.
The court added a second reason for invalidating the California
statute. Determining that a "suspect classification" was established
on the basis of district wealth,35 the court held that an inequality
among school districts" existed in violation of the state equal pro-
tection clause. Underlying the court's determination was the prem-
ise that the finance system "gives high wealth districts a substantial
advantage in obtaining higher quality staff, program expansion and
variety, beneficial teacher-pupil ratios and class sizes, modern
equipment and materials, and high-quality buildings."3 The court's
decision to go a step beyond its fundamental right analysis and to
embrace a suspect classification argument based on wealth may
have been ill-advised. As a result of this decision, all future finance
programs in California must be "fiscally neutral," i.e., they may not
result in wealth-related spending disparities." This aspect of the
30. 18 Cal. 3d at 762, 557 P.2d at 949, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 365. The concept that a state
constitution may demand greater judicial scrutiny than the fourteenth amendment is recur-
ring in public school finance cases. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 72 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359
(1977) and Board of Education v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 606 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1978).
31. 18 Cal. 3d at 765-66, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
32. Id. at 768, 557 P.2d at 953, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
33. Id. at 769, 557 P.2d at 953, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
34. Id. at 776-77, 557 P.2d at 958, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
35. Id. at 765-66, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
36. Id.
37. 18 Cal. 3d at 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
38. The Serrano court identified several finance methods which would meet this criterion.
They are:
1980]
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court's decision is significant because fiscally neutral finance
schemes have been criticized for jeopardizing local control over edu-
cation39 and for failing to promote educational equality among
school districts. 0 Notwithstanding the fiscally neutral criterion
imposed by the Serrano decision, the present California public
school finance scheme does not fully comply with the Serrano man-
date."
" (1) full state funding, with the imposition of a statewide property tax;
(2) consolidation of the . . . school district . . . [and] boundary realignments to
equalize assessed valuations of real property among all school districts;
(3) retention of the present school district boundaries but the removal of commercial
and industrial property from local taxation for school purposes and taxation of such
property at the state level;
(4) school district power equalizing ...
(5) vouchers; and
(6) some combination of two or more of the above."
Id. at 747, 557 P.2d 938-39, 135 Cal. Rptr. 354-55.
39. See Carrington, Financing The American Dream: Equality And School Taxes, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1973), where Prof. Carrington sets forth the persuasive argument that
statewide funding is incompatible with local control over education. See B. LEVIN, T.
MULLER, W. SCANLON, & M. COHEN, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: DISPARITIES AND FISCAL
ALTERNATIVES (1972). See generally 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 293-581 (1974), where a sympos-
ium was held on the subject of public school finance reforms. But see N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON
THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING Oy ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN NEW YORK
STATE, THE FLEISCHMAN REPORT (1973), and J. COONS, W.H. CLUNE & S.D. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970), where fiscally neutral schemes are vigorously advo-
cated.
40. One fiscally neutral financing alternative in particular, district power equalizing
(DPE), has been sharply denounced by critics. DPE establishes a special arrangement wereby
all districts are endowed with an equal ability to raise revenue. Under DPE, two school
districts with unequal property tax bases will generate equal revenue for education while
levying taxes at the same rate, because the property-poor districts receive supplemental aid
from the state to compensate them for their less valuable tax base. Critics argue that DPE
focuses upon tax equality but not upon educational equality. Districts choosing to levy taxes
at different rates, for example, will generate differing amounts of revenue. Disparities in
revenue for financing public school education may therefore exist under a fiscally neutral
scheme, because local tax efforts may vary among localities. See generally Fredman & Lee,
The Ambiguity of Serrano: Two Concepts of Wealth Neutrality, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487,
496-97 (1977) and Sugarman, Principled Serrano Reform, 4 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 511 (1977)
for criticism of the California Court's decision. E.g., Briggs & Main, Serrano II-Case of
Missed Opportunities?, 4 HASTINGO CONsT. L.Q. 453, 478 (1977). For an overview of the
subject, see Andrews, Serrano II Equal Access to School Resources and Fiscal Neutrality-A
View From Washington State, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 425 (1977).
41. The California legislature revised its public school financing law after Serrano, and
enacted a "fiscally neutral" plan. See 1977 Cal. Stats. chs. 292, 894. The new law enjoyed a
short life because soon after its enactment, the California voters approved "Proposition Thir-
teen" which amends Article Thirteen of the California Constitution. The amendment radi-
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The suspect classification analysis based on district wealth pro-
hibits the legislature from enacting a school financing scheme which
produces wealth-related spending disparities. If the Serrano court
had merely held that education is a fundamental right protected by
the state equal protection clause, it would not have so restricted the
legislature."2 Complex decisions concerning the most effective
method for financing public school education and for satisfying
state equal protection requirements should not be made by the judi-
ciary. Rather, the legislature provides the proper forum in whibh to
debate the merits of various public school finance plans.
B. Robinson v. Cahill
The Serrano court imposed a negative duty on the California
legislature by prohibiting the passage of a wealth-related finance
remedy. Robinson v. Cahill, 3 on the other hand, imposed an affirm-
ative duty on the New Jersey legislature by requiring passage of a
finance law guaranteeing a "thorough and efficient"" education for
all students. In Robinson, an action was brought by the parents of
a child who attended the New Jersey public schools." The plaintiffs
charged that the New Jersey state aid formula'" made a child's
cally altered statewide financing for all social programs and undermined the operation of the
fiscally neutral scheme. Interview with Jack Ross, California State Department of Education,
(Nov. 16, 1979). The California legislature has sought to minimize the effect of Proposition
Thirteen upon public school financing. See 1979 Cal. Stats. ch. 282.
42. See Horton v. Meskill, 172-Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). There, the Connecticut
Supreme Court invalidated a state public school finance law using only a fundamental right
analysis. It stated:
Whether we apply the 'fundamental' test adopted by Rodriguez or the pre-Rodriguez
test under our state constitution . . . or the 'arbitrary' test applied by the New Jersey
Supreme Court . . .we must conclude that in Connecticut the right to education is
so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly scruti-
nized.
Id. at 646, 376 A.2d at 373. In holding only that the Connecticut publicschool finance statute
was unconstitutional because it infringed upon a fundamental right, the Horton court re-
mained silent on the issue of which specific finance scheme would satisfy equal protection
guarantees. Although the fundamental right analysis did not require that future financing in
Connecticut be fiscally neutral, the legislature nevertheless enacted such a scheme. S~e
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-261 to 10-266d (West Supp. 1979). -
43. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
44. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
45. Municipal officials also joined in the action on the plaintiffs' side.
46. The New Jersey state aid formula resembled the California foundation program in
that minimum support aid was provided to all districts through state funding. Equalization
aid based on a guaranteed assessed valuation was provided under the New Jersey foundation
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education a function of the fortuitous presence of property wealth
within a school district. Unlike the Serrano court, the New Jersey
court dismissed state equal protection arguments advanced by
plaintiffs.47 However, the court invalidated the New Jersey statute
based on the education clause of the state constitution. 48
The educational mandate of the New Jersey State Constitution
provides that, "[tihe legislature shall provide for the maintenance
and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools
for the instruction of all the children in this state between the age
of five and eighteen years."4 The court stated that the guarantee
"must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity
which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his
role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market. 50 The
court relegated to the legislature the responsibility to "define in
some discernible way the educational obligation" of the state.5' The
court's decision to require the New Jersey legislature to define the
educational obligation of the state caused delay in the passage of
remedial legislation and created uncertainty as to what kind of edu-
cation was required by the state constitution.
The Robinson decision was issued in April 1973; it was not until
January 1976, however, that the New Jersey court gave its approval
to a new public school finance statute.2 In the interim, the court
established a one-year legislative deadline during which period a
new public school finance law was to have been passed,53 extended
the deadline for an additional year,5 ' and ordered a provisional rem-
edy when the second deadline was missed by the legislature.55 The
provisional remedy required the distribution of nearly $300 million
program. See State School Incentive Equalization Aid Law (Bateman Act). 1970 N.J. Laws
ch. 234.
47. 62 N.J. at 500, 303 A.2d at 287. The Robinson court held that education is not a
fundamental right in New Jersey; additionally, the court found that a suspect classification
based upon district wealth did not exist. The court stated that such a holding would threaten
the present system of home rule. Id. at 493-501, 303 A.2d at 283-87.
48. Id. at 519-20, 303 A.2d at 297-98.
49. Id. at 508, 303 A.2d at 291.
50. Id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
51. Id. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297.
52. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J.449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).
53. Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973).
54. Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975),
55. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
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in aid for the 1975-1976 school year. In addition, the Robinson
court's decision to relegate to the legislature the responsibility for
defining the meaning of a "thorough and efficient" education cre-
ated uncertainty as to what kind of education was constitutionally
required in New Jersey. In response, the legislature promulgated ten
vague guidelines purporting to define the meaning of "thorough and
efficient.""6 The standards promulgated by the legislature, because
they represent no more than vague educational ideals, preclude a
realistic assessment of the meaning behind the state's constitutional
guarantee.
The New Jersey legislature passed a finance statute which allows
for considerable financial disparities among school districts. Under
the new act,57 equalizing aid is provided to less than two-thirds of
New Jersey's school districts. In addition, no more than sixty-five
percent of a district's total educational budget will be provided by
the state regardless of need;59 this provision may be highly detrimen-
tal to property-poor districts. Moreover, the legislature failed to
take into account the costs of police and fire protection and other
"municipal overburdens" suffered by large cities. 0 The New Jersey
experience illustrates the problems inherent in requiring a legisla-
56. The guidelines are:
a. Establishment of educational goals at both the State and local levels;
b. Encouragement of public involvement in the establishment of educational goals;
c. Instruction intended to produce the attainment of reasonable levels of proficiency
in the basic communications and computational skills;
d. A breadth of program offerings designed to develop the individual talents and
abilities of pupils;
e. Programs and supportive services for all pupils especially those who are education-
ally disdvantaged or who have special educational needs;
f. Adequately equipped, sanitary and secure physical facilities and adequate materi-
als and supplies;
g. Qualified instructional and other personnel;
g. Efficient administrative procedures;
i. An adequate State program of research and development; and
j. Evaluation and monitoring programs at both the State and local levels.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-5 (West Supp. 1979-80).
57. Id. § 18A:7A-1 to 7a-33.
58. See generally Martell, School Finance Reform: Robinson v. Cahill, 13 URB. L. ANN.
139, 154-56 (1977); see also Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 512-62, 355 A.2d 129, 163-89 (1976)
(Pashman, J., dissenting).
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-3 (West Supp. 1976).
60. 69 N.J. at 553-57, 355 A.2d at 184-86. See note 67 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the concept of "municipal overburden."
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tive body to define, in relative terms, the extent of a state's commit-
ment to education." The legislative response is a vague proclama-
tion under which a variety of public school finance schemes may
exist. The result is that the ultimate public school finance scheme
is modeled after vague educational guidelines which guarantee only
the right to a certain quality of education, rather than the constitu-
tional right, as interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, to
equality of educational experience. 2
C. Board of Education v. Nyquist
Board of Education v. Nyquist (Levittown) was commenced by
several parents whose children attended the public schools in New
York. 3 The plaintiffs sought to invalidate the state public school aid
formula which employed a foundation program as a financing
model.64 They maintained that the formula made a child's educa-
a
61. The Supreme Court of Washington State invalidated its state public school finance
law based upon the educational guarantee contained in the Washington State constitution.
Seattle School Dist, v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). The guarantee reads: "it
is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children
residing within its borders .. " WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 1. The court failed to explain the
meaning behind the education article, except to the extent that it adopted the trial court's
vague definition of certain terms contained within the guarantee. See 90 Wash. 2d at 515-16,
585 P.2d at 93-94. The court left to the legislature the responsibility for "defining and giving
substantive meaning" to the state educational guarantee. Id. at 519, 585 P.2d at 95.
The Washington court's decision to invalidate the public school law based upon the state
education clause may cause delay in the passage of remedial legislation and create uncer-
tainty as to what kind of education is required by the Washington State constitution. The
court was probably cognizant of the delay caused by the Robinson holding. In September
1978, when it issued its decision, the court provided that the legislature would have until July
1, 1981 in which to pass a remedial statute. 90 Wash. 2d at 538, 585 P.2d at 105.
62. It is interesting to note that the Robinson court, in its original decision, held that "an
equal educational opportunity for children was precisely in mind" when the educational
guarantee was included in the state constitution. 62 N.J. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294. Despite this
holding, the Robinson court ultimately approved the present New Jersey finance scheme
which falls considerably short of providing equalizing aid to all school districts.
63. 94 Misc. 2d 475, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
64. Id. at 478, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 610. The New York law guaranteed a minimum per pupil
expenditure of $1,200. If school districts taxed property in the amount of 15 cents on one
hundred dollars of value per annum, the state was committed to making up the difference.
Further, flat grants were provided to all school districts regardless of ability to pay. In
addition, the state finance law contained "save harmless" provisions which provided that a
district would not receive less aid from the state than it had received in previous years.
Additional aid was provided for special education. programs as well as for capital expenses.
Since the assessed value of property was a significant factor in raising school revenue, it was
inevitable that the property-rich districts would raise more school revenue than the property-
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tional opportunity a function of the fortuitous presence of, property
wealth in a school district in violation of equal protection guaran-
tees. "5 The plaintiffs were joined by several boards of education from
urban districts and municipal officials ("plaintiff-intervenors"),"
who further argued that the state aid formula discriminated against
students in large cities because it ignored the "municipal" and
"educational overburdens" endemic to urban areas. 7 The alleged
"municipal overburdens" included the high cost of police and fire
protection,"8 and the large expenditures made by cities for public
assistance, " health care,70 and mass transit.7 ' The alleged
"educational overburdens" included the high incidence of
"impaired learning readiness,"7 "impaired mental and emotional
health, 7 3 and "impaired physical health"74 suffered predomi-
nantely by urban students."
1. Fourteenth Amendment Arguments
The Levittown court rejected plaintiff's argument that the New
York public school finance law was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated fundamental guarantees protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution.76 Citing Rodriguez, the court re-
poor districts. Id. at 483-86, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 613-14. For a more comprehensive treatment of
the New York finance program, see Comment, Board:of Education, Levittown Union Free
School District v. Nyquist: A Return to Federal Equal Protection in School Financing Cases,
7 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 87, 89-91 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Federal Equal
Protection in School Financing Cases]. See note 112 infra for a discussion of developments
in the New York Public School Finance Law since Levittown.
65. 94 Misc. 2d at 478, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
66. The court's only explanation for the joinder of plaintiff-intervenors is the statement
that "a second group of plaintiffs sought and was granted the right to infervene in [the]
action." Id. at 475, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
67. Id. at 479-80, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
68. Id. at 498, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 499, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
71. Id. at 499-500, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 623. See also Federal Equal Protection in School
Financing Cases, supra note 64, at 97-98.
72. 94 Misc. 2d at 511, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
73. Id. at 512, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
74. Id. at 513, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
75. Id. See also Federal Equal Protection in School Financing Cases, supra note 64, at
99-101.
76. 94 Misc. 2d at 519, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 34. The original plaintiffs reserved this claim in
the event that the Supreme Court revised its holding in Rodriguez.
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fused to recognize education as a fundamental right. The court ac-
cepted, however, the argument advanced by plaintiff-intervenors
that the finance statute failed to account for the municipal and
educational overburdens incurred primarily by urban areas.
The "municipal overburden" argument was succinctly expressed
early in the decision:
[t]he density of New York City's population, the condition of its housing
stock and the deterioration of municipal facilities because of deferred main-
tenance all contribute to bringing about high non-educational expenditures.
As these demands siphon off the City's revenues the percentage of revenue
that can be allocated to education declines.77
The "educational overburden" argument was based upon the as-
sumption that the urban school districts have the most difficult and
expensive school populations to educate. The court found that these
school districts, having the largest concentrations of "disadvan-
taged children requiring compensatory education," ' have been
unable to meet the standard necessary to provide their students
with an equal educational opportunity.
The failure of the New York legislature to take into account the
existence of municipal and educational overburdens in enacting the
school financing statute resulted in the creation of a classification
of students by district. Such classification, according to the
Levittown court, bore no 'reasonable relation to the purpose of the
statute, which was to provide state aid to districts in proportion to
their need,7" and to equalize "the varying capabilities of the state's
school districts to finance public education."0 The court held,
therefore, that the statute violated fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees.
The Levittown court's holding may outwardly appear inconsist-
ent with Rodriguez; upon closer examination, however, it is evident
that the two decisions are not inconsistent.
While invalidating the New York law based upon the fourteenth
amendment guarantees, the Levittown court notes that Rodriguez
does not preclude a state court from holding that a finance scheme
violates the fourteenth amendment because it establishes an irra-
77. Id. at 498, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
78. Id. at 510, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
79. Id. at 530, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
80. Id. at 529, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
[Vol. VIII
PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING
tional classification.8' The Levittown court stated that "[tihe fact
that the [Supreme] [C]ourt refused to apply the strict scrutiny
test in Rodriguez does not mean that an educational statute's com-
pliance with the Federal equal protection standards cannot be
tested by a less rigorous standard of review." 2 The question to be
asked then is "whether the challenged [statute] . . . rationally
furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest."8 In Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court concluded that the purpose behind the Texas stat-
ute was to give individual school districts freedom to decide how
much revenue would be raised for education and how the revenue
raised would be spent.84 The Supreme Court reasoned that because
each local school district determined the tax rate to be levied within
each district, the statute bore a reasonable relation to its purpose. 5
In Levittown, on the other hand, the legislative history of the 1974
state aid act indicates that the "overall concern" of the sponsors was
the "equalization of educational opportunity for each pupil of the
state and the provision of equitable special programs for pupils with
special educational needs associated with poverty and handicapped
conditions.""0 The New York statute was found to bear no rational
relationship to this purpose.87
81. Id. at 532, 408 N.Y.S. 2d at 642. For a comprehensive discussion of the propriety of
the Levittown court's decision to apply the fourteenth amendment to public school finance
cases, see Federal Equal Protection in School Financing Cases, supra note 64.
82. 94 Misc. 2d at 531, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
83. 411 U.S. at 55.
84. Id. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
85. 411 U.S. at 55.
86. TASK FORCE ON STATE AID FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, PROPOSAL FOR
1974 LEGISLATION ON STATE AID FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1974).
87. On appeal in the instant case, the State of New York as petitioner has asserted in its
brief that "public school finance laws in New York historically recognized the principle of
local control and that this principle is rational in the face of equal protection challenges."
See Brief for Petitioner at 89-93, Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d
606 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978), appeal docketed, (App. Div. 2d Dep't Nov. 9, 1979).
[hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief]. See also Supplemental Brief II for Petitioner at 24-
36, Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc.2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1978), appeal docketed (App. Div. 2d Dep't Nov. 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Supplemental
Brief]. While there is considerable merit to petitioner's argument, it is evident from the
legislative history of the 1974 statute that local control was just one goal of the act. The
"overall concern", however, was the equalization of educational opportunity, and this statu-
tory purpose distinguishes Levittown from Rodriguez.
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2. State Equal Protection Argument
The Levittown court also reviewed the state aid formula under the
state equal protection clause."8 In considering whether the New York
finance scheme violated state equal protection guarantees, the
Levittown court rejected the argument advanced by plaintiffs that
education was a fundamental right in New York and that the New
York finance system created a "suspect classification" based on
wealth. On the other hand, it took the position that a "sliding
scale" test was appropriate to determine the constitutionality of the
New York statute. 0 Applying the sliding scale test,8" the Levittown
88. 94 Misc. 2d at 519-27, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 634-39. See also Federal Equal Protection in
School Financing Cases, supra note 64, at 105-12.
89. 94 Misc. 2d at 520, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 635. The court cited In re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653,
345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976) to support its conclusion. In In re Levy, the parents
of certain handicapped children challenged a state statute which required them to pay for
the maintenance costs incurred by the educational facilities which their children attended.
The parents argued that the statute violated state equal protection guarantees because the
parents of blind and deaf children did not have to pay for such maintenance costs. The Levy
court, citing Rodriguez, concluded that education is not a "fundamental constitutional
right." 38 N.Y.2d at 658, 345 N.E.2d at 558, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 15. The court, holding that the
proper test to be applied was the rational basis test, concluded that "[a] rational basis does
exist for the distinction made in relieving the parents of deaf children from any financial
responsibility" as a matter of tradition and history. Id. at 658-59, 345 N.E.2d at 559-60, 382
N.Y.S.2d at 15-16. See note 91 infra on the issue of whether the rational basis test or a test
approaching the strict scrutiny standard is appropriate for determining the validity of public
school finance laws.
90. 94 Misc. 2d at 522, 408 N.Y.S. 2d at 636. The term "sliding scale" was selected by
the Levittown court to characterize a test derived from an earlier case, Alevy v. Downstate
Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S. 2d 82 (1976). In Alevy, a white
applicant to medical school, who was denied admission, had suffered reverse discrimination
in violation of the state equal protection clause. The applicant argued that the medical school
practiced reverse discrimination by accepting minority students with less competitive aca-
demic records. 39 N.Y.2d at 328, 348 N.E.2d at 538, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 85. The Alevy court
rejected the application of the strict scrutiny test. It held that education is not a fundamental
right and that "benign discrimination" cases involving education should not be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 332-33, 348 N.E.2d at 543, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 88. The court then
analyzed the policy under the sliding-scale test, stating that the proper questions were:
"whether the challenged discrimination satisfies a substantial state interest;" and if a sub-
stantial state interest is furthered, "whether the object being advanced by the policy could
not be achieved by a less objectionable alternative." Id. at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545-46, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 90.
91. The question whether a "sliding scale" test should be applied in a public school
financing case is open to inquiry. The sliding scale test was applied in the reverse discrimina-
tion case of A levy. See note 90 supra. The court declined, however, to apply the sliding scale
test in Levy, the education case involving the state's obligation to pay for the maintenance
of special residential facilities attended by handicapped children. See note 89 supra. The
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court directed its inquiry toward two issues: first, "whether the
challenged discrimination 'satisfies a substantial State interest;' "92
and second, if a substantial state interest is involved, "whether the
objectives being advanced by the policy could not be achieved by a
less objectionable alternative." 3 Among the state's interests under
the public school finance law, according to the court, were: to afford
"all school children of the state equal educational opportunities in
the elementary and secondary schools;"" and to remedy
"inequalities in such educational opportunities that would exist
because of lack of local resources unless the state furnished financial
aid."95 The court reasoned that because the state aid formula per-
mitted disparities to exist in educational expenditures per pupil
among districts, it did not further the state's interests. The court
concluded, therefore, that the state aid formula violated state equal
protection guarantees. 7
The court applied a rational basis test,98 in addition to the sliding
scale test, to determine whether the operation of the public school
finance law was reasonably related to its purpose. It concluded that
the present formula did not meet the less rigorous standard, stating,
"[wihile the intent and purpose of state aid is to correct and over-
come [financial inequities experienced by property-poor school dis-
tricts], the operative effect of the challenged state aid formula has
been to perpetuate them."9
Levittown court should have applied only a rational basis test, given the New York Court of
Appeals' position to accord varying constitutional protection to students in education cases.
See also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 87, at 27, wherein it is argued that the sliding scale
test, applied in Alevy, is limited to the facts of that particular case. Petitioner argues that
the rational basis test is appropriate in measuring "the validity of statutes regulating educa-
tion in general and for those allocating resources among competing educational priorities in
particular." Id.
92. 94 Misc. 2d at 522, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
93. Id. at 522-23, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (citing Alevy). Because the statute did not further
a substantial state interest, the court did not specifically respond to the question whether
"less objectionable alternatives" exist compared with the present state aid formula. Rather,
the court held that it is the legislature's responsibility to consider alternative methods of
funding public school education.
94. Id. at 529, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 524, 4"08 N.Y.S.2d at 637. The court again recognized that disparities in public
expenditures create disparities in the quality of education.
97. Id. at 525, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 526, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
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The court also declared that under the rational basis test the
finance law violated state equal protection guarantees by failing to
take into account the municipal and educational overburdens ex-
perienced by urban districts. The court noted that two purposes be-
hind the state aid formula were to equalize the varying capabilities
among school districts to finance public education, and to provide
aid to districts in proportion to their need. 00 Although the state aid
statute purported to treat all districts equally, its failure to compen-
sate the cities for their municipal and educational overburdens
"resulted in overstating the capacity of such districts to finance
public education and thereby classi[fied] them as less deserving of
state aid."'' This classification bears no reasonable relation to the
statute's purpose, and was therefore held to be unconstitutional.
The Levittown court's decision to apply a rational basis test in-
stead of a "suspect classification" analysis based on wealth elimi-
nates the problems created in Serrano. The Serrano court, in hold-
ing that the California public school finance statute created a sus-
pect classification, compelled the California legislature to adopt a
fiscally neutral remedy. The Levittown court, on the other hand, in
categorizing the discrimination created by the New York statute as
irrational, remains silent on the question whether public school fi-
nance statutes should be fiscally neutral. The legislature is thereby
free to establish a finance plan which permits wealth-related dispar-
ities among districts' 2 if, as a result of legislative hearings and de-
bates, such is found preferable.
3. Education Clause Argument
The Levittown court also invalidated the New York public school
finance law based on the guarantees imposed by the education arti-
cle of the New York State Constitution. 03 According to the court,
the education clause demands that the state provide an educational
100. See notes 79 & 80 supra and accompanying text.
101. 94 Misc. 2d at 530, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
102. The same benefits accrue to the legislature as a result of the court's decision to apply
a rational basis test to determine the validity of the act under the fourteenth amendment.
103. Id. at 527-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 639-40. The New York State Constitution guarantees
that "[tlhe legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free




opportunity "appropriate" to a child's need. °'0 The Levittown court
held that, based upon evidence at trial, certain students who were
enrolled in the New York public schools did not receive an educa-
tional opportunity appropriate to their needs. The court argued that
students who reside in districts with lower property tax bases, for
example, do not have access to such programs as advanced place-
ment, foreign language, special speech or hearing classes. °5 The
court noted particularly that the finance law was unconstitutional
as it related to urban school districts. According to the court, the
New York constitution mandated a public school system which gave
"to all the State's school children the opportunity to acquire at least
those basic skills necessary to function as a citizen in a democratic
society." ' "' The court held that the public school finance statute,
by failing to give effect to the municipal and educational over-
burden borne by large districts, created "grossly disproportionate
numbers and concentrations of pupils who are deficient in basic
skills."1 07
Although there is support for the court's interpretation of the
education article,' the Robinson experience is a warning that the
legislature may incur difficulty and delay when required to establish
a finance scheme which comports with a vague concept such as "an
appropriate education."'' 0 Moreover, the Robinson experience
teaches that a constitution's guarantees may be circumvented when
104. 94 Misc. 2d at 527, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 639 (citing In re Downey, 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340
N.Y.S.2d 687 (Fain. Ct. 1973)). In Downey, the parents of a handicapped child sought com-
plete state financial support for the child's education at a private institution because the state
did not operate a public facility providing adequate special instruction. The Downey court
interpreted the education article as placing a burden on New York State "to assure that the
educational program provided each child is appropriate to his needs." Id. at 773, 340
N.Y.S.2d at 689. Based on this interpretation, the court granted petitioner's request for full
state financial support. Id. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 87, at 79 where it is argued that
Levy invalidates the Downey court's interpretation of the education clause. Nothing in Levy,
however, precludes interpreting the education clause as requiring that the state provide to
each child an education appropriate to his needs.
105. 94 Misc. 2d at 528, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
106. Id. at 528, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
107. Id. at 533, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
108. See note 104 supra.
109. See Dugan, The Constitutionality of School Finance Systems Under State Law: New
York's Turn, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 573, 597-602 (1976), where the author highlights this
problem and urges that the New York judiciary stay its hand in the entire area of public
school finance reform.
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a legislature is asked to comply with imprecise guidelines. The
Levittown court should have interpreted the education clause re-
strictively,"I while invalidating the finance statute exclusively on
the basis of state equal protection guarantees."'
III. Conclusion
Within the past decade, several states in the nation have
amended public school finance laws in response to the widening gulf
110. There is evidence that the Levittown court's interpretation of the education clause
is out of step with recent holdings by the New York Court of Appeals. See Donohue v. Copiage
Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978). Donohue
involved a claim that the officials of the plaintiff's former high school engaged in educational
malpractice because plaintiff was allowed to graduate without having acquired rudimentary
skills. The court declined to.entertain a cause of action against a school district for educa-
tional malpractice, stating that the general directive of the education clause "was never
intended to impose a duty flowing directly from a local school district to individual pupils to
ensure that each pupil receives a minimum level of education .. " Id. at 443, 391 N.E.2d
at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377. Although the thrust of Donohue was directed to whether the
school district could be held liable in tort for providing an inadequate education to its
students, the "minimum level of education" language describes the nature of the education
guarantee as interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals.
Donohue may not be relevant, however, to a public school finance case such as Levittown.
The court held in Donohue that nothing in the opinion precludes courts from recognizing and
correcting "'gross violations of defined public policy.'" Id. at 445, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 378. See also Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121 (1979). Hoffman is
another educational malpractice case brought by a plaintiff who alleged that the defendant
Board of Education was responsible for negligently assessing plaintiff's intellectual capacity.
Plaintiff was assigned for nearly a decade to a program for mentally retarded children al-
though he was ultimately found not to be retarded. The Court of Appeals, upholding
bonohue, embraced a restrictive interpretation of the education clause, holding "that the
Courts of this state may hot substitute their judgment, or the judgment of a jury, for the
professional judgment of educators and government officials actually engaged in the complex
and often delicate process of educating the many thousands of children in our schools." Id.
at 125-26. The court rejected plaintiffs claim. Although this case is not dispositive of whether
the New York public school finance statute is unconstitutional, the decision does indicate
that the New York Court of Appeals is increasingly de-emphasizing the significance of the
education clause as a basis for obtaining relief in education cases.
111. At the conclusion of the decision, the court returned to a discussion of the educa-
tional article and the fourteenth amendment. Citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1973), the
Levittown court held that the New York public school finance statute violated the educa-
tional article and federal equal protection guarantees because its operation denied certain
students a "meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program" within the
public schools. 94 Misc. 2d at 535, 408 N.Y.S. 2d at 644. Lau involved discrimination against
Chinese-speaking pupils to the extent that only the English language was used by teachers
in the California classrooms. The Levittown court was careful to note that Lau was decided
upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This fact would suggest that Lau does not provide a strong
constitutional basis upon which to invalidate the New York State public school finance law.
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between the property-rich and property-poor districts."' Such
amendments have not represented radical departures from previous
public policy. Periodic amendments to public school finance stat-
utes have been made where states have sought to fulfill their com-
mitments to equality of educational opportunity."3
The appellate court reviewing Levittown should affirm the Nas-
sau County trial judge's decision, insofar as it invalidated the public
school finance statute based upon an equal protection analysis. In
holding merely that the statute is unconstitutional because it oper-
ated in a manner not reasonably related to its purpose, the appellate
court will avoid the problems presented by the Serrano and
Robinson decisions. Most importantly, such a holding would leave
the public school finance problem in the legislative arena. The New
York legislature will then have an opportunity to debate, in the
public light, whether the "overall concern" of public school financ-
ing should be the "equalization of educational opportunity" or the
preservation of strict local control over all aspects of public educa-
tion. Of course, the possibility exists that the legislature may not
enact a system of finance which guarantees educational equality.
The legislature enjoys that prerogative, however, where students are
not afforded an unequivocal constitutional right to an equal educa-
tion."'
Bruce Gitlin
112. See 9 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-50-101 to -118 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 236.012
to .68 (West Supp. 1979). See also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602 (McKinney Supp. 1979), document-
ing the amendments to the New York public school finance law passed since the Levittown
decision was handed down. Petitioner argues that the New York legislature has recently
enacted a more equitable finance system making the Levittown decision moot. Supplemental
Brief, supra note 87, at 1-2. The primary difference between the present finance statute and
the statute considered in Levittown is the method by which state aid is distributed. The new
law provides for a "percentage equalizing formula" whereby state aid is provided based upon
the average annual real property wealth per pupil for the state. Petitioner argues that because
the average is recomputed annually, the present finance system is more equitable than the
foundation formula evaluated in Levittown which did not track annual changes in the aver-
age real property wealth per pupil. Local school districts can, however, under the present
law continue to raise money in excess of the average amount per pupil and there is no
express focus upon providing special aid to the cities. The appellate court will, of course, be
faced with a somewhat different statute for review than the one considered by the Nassau
County court. See generally N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3602 (McKinney Supp. 1979); 1977-78 Cal.
Stats. ch. 292, 894; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A: 7A-1 to 7A-33 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
113. See generally N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602 (McKinney Supp. 1979); 1977-78 Cal. Stats.
chs. 292, 894; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-261 to -266d. (West Supp. 1979); 1977 Cal. Stats. chs.
292, 894.
114. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
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